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We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For
extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and
sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades we have witnessed a rapid development in non-cooperative game theory.
Many new solution concepts, particularly refinements of Nash equilibrium, have been introduced and
successfully applied to many fields in economics, as well as other social sciences. Though game theory
has been applied to many fields, one important issue has not yet received much attention in the
literature. To model any situation as a game, we first specify individuals’ preferences and then apply
certain solution concept to predict the outcome. However, what if the theoretical prediction differs from
the actual outcome? There could be two possible explanations: either individuals do not play according
to the theory, or individuals’ preferences are not correctly specified. In fact, even when the theoretical
prediction coincides with the actual outcome, we should not rule out the possibility that individuals do
not play according to the theory if we are not sure about the specification of individuals’ preferences.
The question therefore is: can we, by any means, test whether individuals play according to the game
theoretic prediction, solely on the basis of the observations of individuals’ actual moves? If we could
not find such a mean of testing, the empirical content of game theory would virtually be void.
Surprisingly, the existing literature hardly contains anything on this issue. The purpose of this paper
is therefore to take a first step to address this issue. 
We, in this paper, instead of criticising the predictive power of the solution concepts, try to
rationalize the actual outcomes. We would ask what the necessary and sufficient conditions for the
observed outcomes to be rationalized by the equilibrium solution concept are. In a sense, our approach
is similar to the classical revealed preference theory initiated by Samuelson (1938).
The general problem under consideration here takes the following form. Let 
 be a collection of
related game forms that several individuals play. Suppose that we can  observe, for every game form
G in 
 an outcome O(G). What conditions must the observed outcomes satisfy so that O(G) is the
equilibrium outcome of a game associated with G, for every G?  Moreover, what are the necessary and4
sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by the equilibrium solution concept?
Notice that in our framework, only outcomes are observed, but not the preferences of individuals.
This is the important distinction between our work and the studies in experimental game theory. In
experimental studies, players’ preferences are assumed to be known to the researchers and hence, the
theoretical equilibrium outcome is known as well. Then the individuals’ actual plays are compared with
the theoretical equilibrium outcome. In our model, as in any other model of revealed preference, only
outcomes are observed. From these observations, we have to construct preferences of individuals so
that the observed outcomes can be rationalized by the equilibrium notion with these constructed
preferences. Also, note that we are imposing no restriction on the preferences (except that they must
be orderings). In many contexts, it is natural to assume some a priori restrictions, for example,
monotonicity in payoffs when the outcomes are monetary payoffs to the individuals. Any such
restriction would indeed imply further conditions for rationalizability of solutions.   
Since in strategic situations players can move simultaneously or sequentially, and in each case
there are a variety of theoretical equilibrium concepts, we have a rich class of models to investigate.
Clearly, different structures of strategic interactions and different solution concepts will have different
implications on the observed outcomes. 
In a recent and independent paper, Sprumont (1999) has taken up exactly the same issue for
normal form games. Sprumont considers finite sets of actions, Ai, one for each player, i; the product set,
A, is called the set of joint actions. A joint choice function f, assigns to every possible subset B, of the
set of joint actions a nonempty set. A joint choice function is Nash rationalizable if there exist
preference orderings on A such that for every B, f(B) coincides with the set of Nash equilibria for the
game defined by the set of actions B with the preferences. Sprumont provides a couple of necessary and
sufficient conditions (Persistence under Expansion and Persistence under Contraction) for a joint
choice function to be Nash-rationalizable.     
1The description is the same as that of an extensive form game as in most textbooks; for example, see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) or Myerson (1991).
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In this paper, we consider situations in which the players move sequentially with perfect
information. Our paper is therefore a perfect complement to that of Sprumont. We fix an extensive
game form (tree) G with complete information so that each player knows all the previous moves
whenever he has to move. A reduced tree, G1, is obtained from G by deleting some branches of G.
Suppose that we observe the players’ actual moves for all reduced trees. If players always play subgame
perfect Nash equilibria, what are the conditions that these observed outcomes must satisfy? We can
derive three necessary conditions (acyclicity of the revealed base relation, internal consistency and
subgame consistency) and also prove that these three (independent) conditions together are sufficient
for subgame perfection rationalisation. It should be emphasised that we do not claim here that
intelligent players must, in practice, play according to these conditions. These conditions are just logical
consequences of subgame perfection. It is possible that these consistency conditions are violated in real
life situations.
2.  EXTENSIVE GAME FORMS WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
Let us first describe an extensive game form G with perfect information.
1 
An extensive game form G is a rooted tree which consists of a set of nodes, X, with a distinct
initial node x0, and a precedence function p: X\{x0}® X. For any node x Î X, the node p(x) is the
immediate predecessor of x. In turn, x is an immediate successor of the node p(x). Formally, a node z
is an immediate successor of a node x if p(z) = x. 
A node y is a predecessor of x if y = p
k(x), for some k. In return, x is called a successor of y. For
any x Î X, let s(x) and S(x) denote, respectively, the set of immediate successors and the set of all6
successors of x. A node z is called a terminal node if there exists no x Î X such that p(x) = z. The set
of all terminal nodes is denoted by Z.   
The set of players is N = {1, 2, < , n}. The set of non-terminal nodes, X \ Z, are partitioned into
n subsets, X1, ..., Xn, where Xi is the set of nodes at which player i moves; at any x Î Xi,  player i has to
choose an immediate successor y Î s(x).
A path Ã is a finite sequence of nodes {xk: k = 0, .., m} where xk = p(xk +1), for each k and xm is
a terminal node. Since G is a tree, any path Ã can also be identified with the terminal node z(Ã) at
which it ends. In this paper, we consider game forms that always end, i.e., game forms that do not have
any infinite sequence of nodes {xk} with xk = p(xk+1) for each k.
Suppose that we let all the players play an extensive game form G. As G always ends, we can
observe, at its completion, a path Ã leading to a terminal node z(Ã). Nothing else, particularly,
players’ intended moves off the observed path Ã can be observed. But additional information is
revealed by the players’ choices when they play different reduced game forms of G. 
Definition 1.  A reduced game form G¢ of an extensive game form G is a game form consisting of (i)
the set of terminal nodes Z¢, a subset of Z, and (ii) all the non-terminal nodes that belong to path leading
to any terminal node in Z¢. Let us denote the set of all nodes of G¢ by X¢.
Any standard subgame form selects all the terminal nodes that are successors of a particular non-
terminal node. Note that it may not start at x0, however, it can always be associated trivially with a
reduced game form, consisting of the unique "path" from x0 to the starting point of the subgame and
the subgame form itself. Obviously, not all reduced game forms are subgame forms.7
Let 
  be the set of all possible reduced game forms of an extensive game form G. Suppose that
we can observe the outcome for each reduced game form G¢ Î Z¢ so that we have an outcome function
O: 
  ® Z with O(G¢) Î Z¢ for every G¢ Î 
.
We now consider several necessary conditions for an outcome function O to be rationalized by
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. So let us assume that each player i has a strict ordering Qi over all
the terminal nodes and, therefore, O(G¢) is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for
every reduced game G¢, with players’ preferences (Qi)i Î N  (which we do not know), restricted to Z¢. 
Given an outcome function O, let us first construct, for each player i, the revealed base relation,
Pi, over the terminal nodes. If a player i has to play differently in a game form to reach two different
terminal nodes u and v, his preferences over u and v can be revealed via the reduced game form G¢
which has only two terminal nodes, u and v. 
Formally, for any u, v Î Z, let x be the node at which the paths to u and v diverge. If x Î Xi, then
uPiv if and only if u = O(G¢), where G¢ is the reduced game form which has only two terminal nodes,
u and v.
Although the revealed base relation, Pi, is generally incomplete, it should be acyclic as it must
coincide with Qi whenever it is defined. Thus, our first necessary condition is:
Condition 1. (Acyclicity of the Revealed Base Relation)  For each player i, the revealed base relation,
Pi, is acyclic.
Later, we will show that when Condition 1 holds, Pi can actually be extended, via Zorn’s Lemma,
to a strict preference ordering on Z which is both complete and transitive. It is important to note that
all Pi’s are constructed through the outcome function O only, and hence, Condition 1 is a well-defined
condition on O.8
For any reduced game form G¢ Î 
, and any node x Î X¢\ Z¢, let Gx¢ denote the reduced game
form which has Zx¢ = Z¢ÇS(x) as the set of terminal nodes. (This is just the standard subgame form of
G¢ beginning at x.)  If a terminal node u is the unique (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) outcome for
a reduced game G¢ and u is a successor of x, then u should also be the (subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium) outcome for any subgame Gx¢ of G¢. Thus, our second necessary condition is:
Condition 2. (Internal Consistency)  For any G¢ Î 
, if x is a predecessor of O(G¢),  then O(G¢x) =
O(G¢).
Finally, if u is the unique (subgame perfect Nash equilibrium) outcome of a game, then at each
node x on the path leading to u, the player who moves at x should prefer u to any other terminal node
that could have been reached from x had he moved otherwise. Thus, our third necessary condition is:
Condition 3. (Subgame Consistency)  Consider any G¢Î 
, and x Î X¢\ Z¢. Let u = O(Gx¢). Take any
y Î s(x) such that y is not on the path to u. Let v = O(Gy¢). Then, O(G¢¢) = u, where G¢¢ Î 
 is the
reduced game form which has only two terminal nodes, u and v.
We have obtained the above three conditions as consequences of subgame perfect rationalization.
If players play according to subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, then the observed outcomes must satisfy
these conditions. Of course, there may be other necessary conditions. However, all other possible
conditions must follow from Conditions 1-3 as Conditions 1-3 together turn out to be sufficient for
subgame perfection rationalization.9
Theorem 1.  Assume that G is an extensive game form and O(.) is an outcome function on 
. There
exist strict preference orderings Qi’s over Z, for all players, such that O(G¢) coincides with the unique
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (G¢, (Qi)i Î N) for every G¢Î 
 if and only if O(.)
satisfies Conditions 1-3.
Proof.  The necessity of the three conditions is straightforward and hence the proof is devoted to
showing the sufficiency.
We first show that the strict partial preference relation, Pi, as defined above can be extended to
a strict ordering on Z which is complete and acyclic (equivalently, transitive, for a complete ordering)
for each player i. Suppose that Pi is not complete. For any pair u and v that are not ranked by Pi, let
uPi¢v if there exists a sequence {uk}1£k£ K with u = u1, v = uK, and ukPiuk+1 for all k; and vPi¢u otherwise.
By adding exactly one of these two relations to the original Pi, we obtain an extension of Pi. Suppose
that this extension has a cycle C. Since the original Pi is acyclic (by Condition 1), C must contain uPi¢v,
or vPi¢u, as one of the links in C. If uPi¢v, then there exists a chain from u to v via Pi-domination. But
then, replacing uPi¢v in C by this chain yields a cycle for Pi, which contradicts Condition 1. On the other
hand, if C contains vPi¢u, then the remaining links in C from u to v implies uPi¢v (by the definition of
uPi¢v); again a contradiction. Hence, the extension is also acyclic. Then a routine argument using Zorn’s
Lemma shows that we can extend Pi to a strict preference relation Qi on Z which is complete and
acyclic (cf. Theorem 1, Richter, 1966). 
We now prove that for each reduced game form G¢, the observed outcome O(G¢) coincides with
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the game (G¢, (Qi)i Î N). First, we construct
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that yields O(G¢) as the outcome for every G¢. Consider the
following strategy for every player i. At each node x Î Xi, i chooses the immediate successor that leads
to O(G¢). If every player follows this strategy, then the outcome is O(G¢). Let us show that these
strategies indeed constitute a Nash equilibrium for every Gx¢ where x Î X¢\ Z¢.       
2The last part of the proof rather shows the one deviation property (as in Lemma 98.2 of Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994)
which is a necessary and sufficient condition for subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Suppose this is not true. Then there must exist a node x such that these strategies do not constitute
a Nash equilibrium for Gx¢, but they do for Gy¢, for all successors y of x. For, if such an x does not exist,
we would be able to find an infinite sequence of nodes {xk} with xk = p(xk +1), for each k, which
contradicts the assumption that the game always ends. Since these strategies do not form a Nash
equilibrium for Gx¢, there exists a player i who can gain by deviating in Gx¢.  Obviously, i has to deviate
at some node on Ã,  the path that leads to u = O(Gx¢). Let y be the first node on Ã after x at which
player i deviates. If y ¹ x, then O(Gy¢) = O(Gx¢) by Condition 2 and O(Gy¢) is the Nash equilibrium
outcome for Gy¢, by assumption; so, i cannot gain. Thus y = x, i.e., i has to deviate at x in order to gain.
Now consider z, the immediate successor of x under i’s deviation. Let v = O(Gz¢) = SPNE(Gz¢, (Qi)i Î N).
Suppose G¢¢ is the reduced game form which has only two terminal nodes, u and v. By Condition 3, u
= O(G¢¢). This implies uPiv (i.e., uQiv), by the definition of Pi, contradicting the hypothesis that player
i can deviate and gain
2. 
The uniqueness of the subgame prefect Nash equilibrium outcome for (G¢, (Qi)i Î N) can be proved
in a similar fashion.  b
The three conditions in Theorem 1 are logically independent. Let us present three examples in
which the respective outcome functions satisfy different pairs of the three conditions but not all of them,
and thus no subgame perfect rationalisation can be found for these outcome functions.
Example 1.  Consider the game tree G as in Figure 1. G has three proper reduced game forms, G1, G2,
and G3.
[Insert Figure 1 here]11
Consider the outcome function O1, as shown in Figure 1: O1(G) = B, O1(G1) = (A, L), O1(G2) = (A, L),
and O1(G3) = B. It is easy to verify that O1 satisfies acyclicity of the revealed base relation and internal
consistency. However, consider the condition of subgame consistency with G¢ = G and x = x0. The
outcome, O1(G) is B. Now consider the subgame form G1, the outcome of which is (A, L). But the
outcome of G2 which consists of B and (A, L) only is (A, L), violating subgame consistency.  
Example 2.  Consider the same game tree as in Example 1 with a different outcome function O2, as
shown in Figure 2: O2(G) = (A, L), O2(G1) = (A, R), O2(G2) = (A, L), and O2(G3) = B.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
It is easy to verify that O2 satisfies acyclicity of the revealed base relation and subgame consistency.
However, consider the condition of internal consistency with G¢ = G and the node x where player 2
moves. Note that O2(G) is (A, L) but O2(G1) is (A, R), violating internal consistency.
Example 3.  This is a variation of the game tree in Example 1 in which only player 1 moves at both the
non-terminal nodes. Consider the outcome function O3, as shown in Figure 3: O3(G) = B, O3(G1) = (A,
R), O3(G2) = (A, L), and O3(G3) = B.  
[Insert Figure 3 here]
It is easy to verify that O3 satisfies internal and subgame consistency. However, consider the outcomes
of the three reduced games forms, G1, G2 and G3. These outcomes clearly violate the condition of
acyclicity of the revealed base relation.
It is worth mentioning that Conditions 1-3 are not sufficient for the existence of one single
preference relation (a social preference relation) P over all terminal nodes of G such that O(G¢) is the12
best element of P among terminal nodes of G¢ for every G¢Î 
. The following outcome function has
a subgame perfect rationalization, but does not have a representative single agent rationalization. 
Example 4.  Consider the same game tree as in Example 1 and the outcome function O4, as shown in
Figure 4: O4(G) = B, O4(G1) = (A, L), O4(G2) = B, and O4(G3) = (A, R). 
[Insert Figure 4 here]
It is easy to verify that O4 satisfies all the three conditions. However this outcome function could not
be rationalised had this been a choice of one individual only as the last three outcomes form a cycle for
one individual.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have studied equilibrium notions for games from the revealed preference
perspective. For game trees with perfect information we have derived necessary and sufficient
conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. This
result extends
standard result of revealed preferences to multi-agent decision making situations. However, in contrast
to the classical result in the individual revealed preference theory, the preference relations of agents in
a game context cannot be uniquely determined by the observed choices. If an agent cannot change the
outcome from a to b by a unilateral change of his action, his preferences over a and b can never be
recovered from the observed actions.
Our result in this paper deals with a simple case only and we have not imposed any restrictions
on the outcomes or the preferences. In more concrete problems, one can think of introducing additional
assumptions on the preferences. For example, if the outcome is just a division of money, then it may     
3Peleg and Tijs (1996) actually call this condition independence of irrelevant strategies. The term consistency in their paper
refers to a narrower condition.
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be reasonable to assume that agents' preferences are monotonic in their own monetary payoffs. Or, if
each agent's actions can be represented by a convex set in a Euclidean space, it is often assumed (in the
standard game theory literature) that preferences are continuous and convex (particularly, in the context
of normal form games). We would, eventually, want to implement our study through some form of
experiments. Since all meaningful experiments are conducted in concrete contexts, we need to establish
results that are sensible to the specifics of the experiments. Hence, our paper is just the beginning of
a broader research programme, which will extend the basic result here to cover other structures of
strategic interactions and game theoretic solution concepts.
We should mention that other authors such as Peleg and Tijs (1996) have previously considered
consistency
 conditions to characterise Nash equilibrium
3. For any well-specified (normal form) game,
in which the players’ payoff functions are already given, they show that the players must play Nash
equilibria if (i) each player is a utility maximiser and (ii) all players choose strategies consistently. Their
viewpoint is clearly different from ours. In their work, consistency is used as a normative criterion that
forces players to adopt Nash equilibrium behaviour. We, however, consider weak consistency as an
empirically verifiable condition on the observed choices for rationalization by strict Nash equilibrium.
We make no claim that the players always choose or should choose strategies in such a consistent
fashion.
For extensive game forms, we require that the outcomes of all possible reduced trees be
observable. There are many simple and interesting game situations such as dividing-a-dollar, in which
the players have infinitely many strategies but, practically, only finitely many observations can be
made. Hence, one would like to know whether our results can be extended to such cases with only     
4This is parallel to Afriat’s (1967) approach to the theory of revealed preferences, vis-a-vis Samuelson’s.
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limited observations
4. It is easy to see that our conditions are still necessary for subgame prefect
rationalisation, but sufficiency is far from obvious. 15
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